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INTRODUCTION 
aws regulating water pollution and allocation are extremely 
difficult to make and enforce. The Clean Water Act (CWA), one 
of our nation’s most prominent environmental statutes, aims to 
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the Nation’s waters.”1 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), which has oversight for the implementation of the CWA, 
currently faces heat from industry, agriculture, timber, environmental, 
and political groups regarding many different sections of the CWA. 
Applying the CWA to surface water is difficult enough because of the 
debate over the CWA’s jurisdictional language.2 The task of applying 
the CWA grows even more challenging when groundwater is 
involved because the link between groundwater and surface water has 
not been consistently interpreted by courts. 
Groundwater and surface water flow into one another, so discharge 
of pollution to one can contaminate the other. Unfortunately, trying to 
regulate the discharge of pollution to groundwater under the CWA is 
like trying to hammer a square peg into a round hole—the statutory 
language, legislative history, and subsequent court cases address 
groundwater ambiguously. Groundwater is partially protected under 
other statutes,3 but all too often pollutants travel through groundwater 
and contaminate surface water that is regulated by the CWA. 
Plaintiffs seeking redress for contamination to groundwater have 
brought CWA claims since the 1970s when the statute was enacted, 
and they continue to do so. A robust body of law has developed 
around the application of the CWA jurisdiction to groundwater, and 
the CWA remains an important, if imperfect, tool for potential 
litigants filing suit for groundwater contamination. 
 
1 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
2 Congress designated CWA jurisdiction over “navigable waters” and abstractly defined 
“navigable waters” as “waters of the United States, including territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 
1362. This abstract definition raises “a question of whether navigability operates as a limit 
on Congress’ constitutional power to regulate waters . . . under the Commerce Power.” 
JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
639 (4th ed. 2006). The definition also spurs controversy about which “waters” EPA may 
regulate as it administers CWA permit programs. 
3 Several federal statutes protect groundwater in some way. See Safe Drinking Water 
Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 300f–300j (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6901–6992k (2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). Oregon has statutes protecting 
groundwater, including the Underground Injection Control Program. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
468B.150–468B.190, 468B.195–468B.197. 
L
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Potential litigants must understand the state of law surrounding the 
CWA in general, potential arguments for and against regulating 
contamination to groundwater under the CWA, and how upcoming 
developments in CWA law may affect groundwater issues. This 
Comment intends to guide litigants through some of the subtler and 
often-overlooked points of the complicated issue of groundwater 
pollution control under the CWA in light of current events. 
Part I summarizes the larger issues and current events relating to 
the CWA—namely two recent United States Supreme Court cases 
addressing the jurisdiction of the CWA and a proposed joint guidance 
memorandum issued by EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(Corps).4 Part II concentrates on the groundwater issue and considers 
arguments for and against CWA regulation of pollutants that travel 
through groundwater to regulated surface water. Part III looks at the 
future of groundwater under the CWA, considering the relationship 
between the specific groundwater debate and larger CWA issues in a 
legal, practical, and political sense. 
I 
THE CLEAN WATER ACT GENERALLY: THE STATE OF AFFAIRS 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) has been a source of frequent and 
heated litigation since its inception in 1972. Forty years later, litigants 
still battle about various CWA provisions in lower courts, and the 
United States Supreme Court continues to grant certiorari to CWA 
cases.5 Section A briefly describes two of the most contentious CWA 
sections, sections 402 and 404, and the permit programs administered 
 
4 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has a central role in the administration of 
CWA Section 404 dredge-and-fill permits: “(a) The Secretary may issue permits, after 
notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into 
the navigable waters at specified disposal sites . . . (d) The term ‘Secretary’ . . . means the 
Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344. In other 
words, the Corps: “[makes] individual and general permit decisions; [c]onducts . . . 
jurisdictional determinations; [d]evelops policy and guidance; and [e]nforces Section 404 
provisions. Wetland Regulatory Authority: Regulatory Requirements, EPA, http://www 
.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/reg_authority_pr.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
5 The United States Supreme Court has two CWA cases on its docket. L.A. Cnty. Flood 
Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, No. 11-460, 2012 WL 2368688 (U.S. June 25, 
2012); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063 (2011), cert. granted sub nom. 
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., No. 11-338, 2012 WL 2368685 (U.S. June 25, 2012); see 
also Thomas G. Echikson, Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Two Clean Water Act 
Cases Involving Stormwater Discharges, MARTINDALE.COM (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www 
.martindale.com/environmental-law/article_LeClairRyan_1566162.htm. 
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under those sections. Section B identifies one of the greatest conflicts 
in CWA law, the debate over the jurisdictional scope of the statute, 
which became an even more confusing issue following two United 
States Supreme Court cases. Section C summarizes the Corps and 
EPA’s attempts to clarify the jurisdictional scope of the CWA and the 
proposed legislation attempting to impede the agencies’ guidance and 
rulemaking. 
A. Overview of the Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act was enacted as a 1972 amendment to the 
1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act.6 The 1972 Amendment 
granted Congress authority to regulate interstate waters7 and 
navigable waters8 through the Commerce Clause.9 Additionally, it 
gave various agencies the authority to regulate aspects of the public 
right to navigation.10 To achieve the goal of restoring and maintaining 
“the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the [n]ation’s 
waters,”11 Congress directed the EPA Administrator to “prepare or 
develop comprehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or 
eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters and ground waters 
and improving the sanitary condition of surface and underground 
waters”12 
Thus, the CWA aims to regulate water quality via regulation of 
discharges of pollutants (effluents) and implementation of water 
quality standards.13 One way that the CWA does so is by requiring a 
 
6 History of the Clean Water Act, EPA (Aug 23, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs 
/laws/cwahistory.html. 
7 Interstate water is water that crosses state lines; thus, Congress has the authority to 
make water pollution and allocation laws under the Commerce Clause. SAX ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 835. 
8 “Navigable water” is a large, complicated legal designation based on historical 
principles that bodies of water used for navigation, commerce, and fishing should be held 
in trust by the government for public use. See id. at 522–23. Many different definitions of 
navigable water apply to various facets of water law. See generally id. at 521–673. 
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes 
. . . .”). This clause authorizes a wide variety of legislation that governs intrastate 
commerce and activities. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 242–43 (3d ed. 2006). 
10 See 33 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2006). 
11 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
12 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
13 Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.epa.gov 
/lawsregs/laws/cwa.html. 
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permit for point-source discharges14 of pollutants into navigable 
waters through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permits, which are issued pursuant to CWA section 402.15 
These permits regulate the types of discharges that are most 
commonly associated with the CWA in the public mind; for example, 
discharges of effluent via pipes from sewage treatment plants, animal 
feeding operations, and industrial facilities (including industrial and 
municipal stormwater discharges).16 Generally, states administer 
section 402 NPDES permit programs under the authorization and 
oversight of EPA.17 Another way the CWA regulates water quality is 
by requiring permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material into 
navigable waters, including wetlands, pursuant to CWA section 
404.18 For example, section 404 dredge-and-fill permits are required 
for filling in wetlands for development or infrastructure projects, for 
water management projects like building dams, or for mining.19 The 
Corps administers the section 404 dredge-and-fill permit program, 
and both the Corps and EPA develop policy and guidance and enforce 
section 404 provisions.20 
Both sections 402 (NPDES) and (404) (dredge-and-fill permits) 
apply to “navigable waters,” which the CWA defines as “waters of 
the United States, including the territorial seas.”21 Unsurprisingly, this 
general definition of CWA jurisdiction is the subject of ample 
litigation and considerable uncertainty for industries and entities who 
may require CWA permits, for agencies in charge of enforcing CWA 
permit violations, and for private citizen groups concerned about 
pollution of their local or regional water sources. Contamination of 
groundwater primarily arises in section 402 cases, but it may also 
contribute to proving jurisdiction in section 404 dredge-and-fill 
permit cases by contributing to adjacency or a significant nexus 
between wetlands and waters of the United States. Additionally, 
because this definition of CWA jurisdiction applies to all sections of 
 
14 Point sources are specific, discrete flows of water, like a ditch or pipe. Id. 
15 See id. 
16 See NPDES Topics, EPA (Feb.1, 2007), http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/pareas.cfm. 
17 See State and Tribal Program Authorization Status, EPA (Jan. 7, 2005), http://cfpub 
.epa.gov/npdes/statestribes/astatus.cfm. 
18 Section 404 Permitting, EPA (Oct. 9, 2012), http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance 
/cwa/dredgdis/. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006). 
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the CWA, Supreme Court cases addressing CWA jurisdiction in 
section 404 wetlands cases are relevant to section 402 groundwater 
cases. 
B. SWANCC and Rapanos Create a Jurisdictional Debate 
Two Supreme Court cases—SWANCC and Rapanos—attempted to 
clarify the rule for deciding which wetlands were considered waters 
of the United States22 but instead created confusion and uncertainty 
over the scope of waters covered by the CWA.23 In its 2001 SWANCC 
decision, the Supreme Court held that the Corps exceeded its 
authority by asserting CWA jurisdiction over non-navigable, isolated, 
intrastate waters based on the presence of migratory birds.24 In part, 
the Corps had defined “waters of the United States” by the 
promulgation of the Migratory Bird Rule.25 Based on this rule, the 
Corps had decided the Solid Waste Agency required a permit to 
discharge fill material into abandoned sand and gravel pits,26 and the 
Solid Waste Agency sued.27 The Court held that the Corps had 
impermissibly extended the jurisdiction of the CWA to non-
 
22 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 172–74 (2001). 
23 Clean Water Protection Rule, EPA (Oct. 24, 2012), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opei 
/rulegate.nsf/byRIN/2040-AF30?opendocument#5. 
24 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. Non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters, in this case, 
were abandoned sand and gravel pits with excavation trenches that had evolved into 
permanent and seasonal ponds and become habitat for migratory birds. Id. at 162. The 
waters were not navigable by definition under the CWA, did not flow into navigable 
waters, and did not cross state lines. See id. at 173. 
25 The Corps promulgated the Migratory Bird Rule as an interpretation of its CWA 
authority. Id. at 164. The Rule allowed the Corps to issue permits for abandoned gravel 
pits which contained water that was part of migratory bird habitat. Id. at 164–65. The 
Court struck the rule down. Id. at 166–67. 
26 The Corps originally concluded that sand and gravel pits were not wetlands, but after 
the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission informed the Corps that over a hundred 
migratory bird species had been observed at the site, including several known to depend 
upon aquatic environments for a significant portion of their life, the Corps changed its 
jurisdictional determination. “[T]he Corps . . . ‘determined that the seasonally ponded, 
abandoned gravel mining depressions located on the project site, while not wetlands, did 
qualify as ‘waters of the United States’ . . . based upon the following criteria: (1) the 
proposed site had been abandoned as a gravel mining operation; (2) the water areas and 
spoil piles had developed a natural character; and (3) the water areas are used as habitat by 
migratory bird [sic] which cross state lines.’” Id. at 164–65 (quoting the Corps’ reasoning 
justifying the Rule). 
27 Id. at 165. 
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navigable, isolated, intrastate waters.28 In its opinion, though, the 
Court did not clarify the test for defining which non-navigable waters 
are sufficiently related to navigable waters to confer CWA 
jurisdiction.29 Also, the Court mentioned, but did not decide, the issue 
of whether Congress’s Commerce Clause power, as asserted through 
the CWA, could constitutionally extend to non-navigable, intrastate 
waters.30 
Some lower courts viewed the SWANCC holding narrowly, 
interpreting the case to say the Corps’ jurisdiction could not rest 
solely on migratory birds but the holding may permit jurisdiction if 
the water is not isolated or intrastate.31 Other courts read SWANCC 
more broadly, and interpreted the holding to mean that the CWA’s 
jurisdiction is limited to navigable waters or non-navigable waters 
that are directly linked to navigable waters.32 
In the 2006 case, Rapanos v. United States, the Court attempted to 
establish a test for deciding what waters constitute “waters of the 
United States,” and through that definition define the Corps’ authority 
to regulate wetlands under the CWA.33 Rapanos considered whether 
four wetlands areas located near man-made drains or ditches, which 
eventually drained into navigable waters, could be regulated under the 
 
28 Id. at 164, 172. The Court reasoned that Congress specifically stated that the CWA 
applied to navigable waters and that it was not correct to read out the word navigable. Id. 
at 172. Justice Scalia reconnected “waters of the US” to “navigable” and held that the 
Corps’ permitting jurisdiction, just based on the presence of migratory birds, did not reach 
waters that were non-navigable, isolated, and intrastate. Id. 
29 Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act after SWANCC: Using 
a Hydrological Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
811, 814 (2003). The Court failed to address whether it intended to supersede the 
significant nexus test from United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 
(1985). Id. at 819. In Riverside Bayview, the Court held that the Corps had jurisdiction 
over non-navigable wetlands that were adjacent to navigable waters if the adjacent 
wetlands had a significant ecological and biological connection to the navigable waters; 
also, the word “navigable” was of limited import. Id. at 837. 
30 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172–73. The Corps alleged that migratory birds crossed 
state lines, and thus, could be regulated under the Commerce Clause. Id. The constitutional 
question of the extent of the Commerce Clause is also relevant to the regulation of 
groundwater, since underground aquifers lie beneath multiple states and the actions of one 
state can impact the water quality of another. 
31 See Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 425 
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); United 
States. v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003). 
32 See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003); Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 
250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001). 
33 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
MAKOWSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  1:09 PM 
502 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 495 
CWA as “waters of the United States.”34 All the wetlands had surface 
water connections to the drains or ditches, but it was “not clear 
whether the connections between these wetlands and the nearby 
drains and ditches [were] continuous or intermittent, or whether the 
nearby drains and ditches contain[ed] continuous or merely 
occasional flows of water.”35 The Court was asked to decide whether 
the term “waters of the United States” in the CWA extended to 
wetlands that did not contain navigable waters and were not adjacent 
to navigable waters.36 
Unfortunately, the Court failed to agree on a majority opinion, and 
the case produced more confusion rather than a clear test. The 
plurality held that “waters of the United States” only includes 
relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of 
water, not seasonal or intermittent channels.37 Based on this holding, 
the plurality set out a two-part test for determining whether the Corps 
had CWA jurisdiction over wetlands.38 First, navigable waters for the 
purpose of the CWA mean only relatively permanent bodies of water, 
not temporary flows.39 Second, only wetlands with a continuous 
surface connection to waters of the United States may be regulated 
under the CWA.40 Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, disagreed 
with this two-part test and advocated for the use of the “significant 
nexus” test, stipulating that the specific wetland at issue must possess 
a significant nexus with the navigable waters.41 Since there is no 
 
34 Id. at 729. The importance of the drains and ditches which eventually emptied into 
the navigable waters was that they provided the necessary link for the Corps to require a 
permit for filling in of occasionally saturated land. See id. The alleged wetlands could not 
be regulated unless they were “adjacent wetlands.” Id. at 729–30. Adjacent wetlands are 
defined by Corps regulation as “bordering, contiguous [to], or neighboring.” Id. at 724 
(quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2004)). “Wetlands separated from other waters of the 
United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like 
are ‘adjacent wetlands.’” Id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2004)). 
35 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 729. 
36 Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
37 Id. at 739. 
38 Id. at 757. 
39 Id. 
40 See id. 
41 Id. at 786–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase 
“navigable waters,” if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly 
situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as 
“navigable.” When, in contrast, wetlands’ effects on water quality are speculative 
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majority opinion in Rapanos, controlling legal rules may be drawn 
from principles espoused by five or more justices.42 Therefore, the 
Court created a jurisdictional debate by failing to specify to lower 
courts and regulatory authorities whether to apply a two-part test or a 
significant nexus test to determine which waters may be regulated 
under the CWA. Lower courts have split on which test to apply, and 
some apply both tests.43 Similarly, the Corps and EPA’s jurisdictional 
guidance following Rapanos incorporates language from both tests.44 
C. Guidance, Rulemaking, and Politics 
Aside from major litigation, EPA and the Corps confront CWA 
issues by issuing guidance. Although a formal rulemaking process 
would provide more clarity, political pressure limits executive action 
on these contentious issues, as discussed in Part III.45 
 
or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory 
term “navigable waters.” 
Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
42 EPA & ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES & CARABELL V. 
UNITED STATES  3 (2008). 
43 WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION § 4:31.1 (2012), available at 
Westlaw. The Eleventh Circuit applies the significant nexus test. United States v. Robison, 
505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007). The First and Eighth Circuits accept either test. 
United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 467 
F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits require that both tests be met. 
United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lucas, 516 
F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding jury instructions requiring “that the jury find that 
the wetlands were waters of the United States adjacent to navigable waters with a 
significant nexus between the wetland and the navigable-in-fact waterway to establish 
CWA jurisdiction”). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits apply their own iteration of a 
combination of the tests, applying the significant nexus test also leaving open the option of 
applying the two-part test in rare circumstances. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of 
Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 
464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006). 
44 EPA & ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DRAFT GUIDANCE ON IDENTIFYING WATERS 
PROTECTED BY THE CLEAN WATER ACT 2–3 (2011), available at http://water.epa.gov 
/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/wous_guidance_4-2011.pdf. 
45 Agency guidance can be changed at any time and does not have a substantive legal 
effect, but it is a faster way of explaining how EPA or Corps field-staff interpret existing 
regulations. A rule goes through a more stringent process and is then given administrative 
deference. Bruce Myers et al., Dialogue, Assessing Jurisdiction Under the New Clean 
Water Act Guidance, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10773, 10784 (2011) 
(hereinafter “ELI Dialogue”) (statement by Lawrence Liebsman, Partner at Holland & 
Knight, LLP). 
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In 2003, the Corps and EPA published a joint memorandum 
addressing CWA jurisdiction following SWANCC.46 In 2008, they 
published another memorandum addressing jurisdiction following 
Rapanos, attempting to provide some clarity and incorporate both 
possible tests for jurisdiction—the plurality two-part test and Justice 
Kennedy’s significant nexus test.47 This 2008 memorandum states 
that the Corps and EPA will assert jurisdiction over traditional 
navigable waters, wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, relatively 
permanent non-navigable tributaries to navigable waters, and 
wetlands that abut such tributaries.48 The agencies will conduct fact-
specific analyses to determine whether certain waters have a 
significant nexus with navigable waters.49 The significant nexus test 
will apply to non-navigable tributaries and adjacent wetlands that are 
not relatively permanent as well as wetlands adjacent to, but not 
abutting, relatively permanent non-navigable tributaries.50 The 
significant nexus test “includes consideration of hydrologic and 
ecologic factors” and assesses “the flow characteristics and functions 
of the tributary itself and the functions performed by all wetlands 
adjacent to the tributary to determine if they significantly affect the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream traditional 
navigable waters.”51 Additionally, the Corps’ and EPA’s inclusion of 
the permanence and adjacency requirements echo the Rapanos 
plurality’s two-part test: “[W]hether the ditches or drains near each 
wetland are ‘waters’ in the ordinary sense of containing a relatively 
permanent flow; and (if they are) whether the wetlands in question are 
‘adjacent’ to these ‘waters’ in the sense of possessing a continuous 
surface connection that creates the boundary-drawing problem            
. . . .”52 
In 2011, EPA and the Corps proposed new guidance to better 
clarify which bodies of water are protected in addition to increasing 
 
46 See Clean Water Act Definition of “Water of the United States,” EPA (Aug. 9, 
2012), http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/CWAwaters.cfm. 
47 EPA & ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION, supra note 42 
(incorporating revisions from the memorandum originally issued on June 6, 2007, and 
incorporating public comments and the agencies’ experience in implementing the Rapanos 
decision). 
48 Id. at 1. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 757 (2006). 
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regulatory clarity, consistency, predictability, and effectiveness.53 The 
guidance focuses on “protection of smaller waters [(tributaries)] that 
feed into larger ones, to keep downstream water safe from upstream 
pollutants.”54 EPA notes that “[t]he guidance will not extend federal 
protection to any waters not historically protected under the Clean 
Water Act and will be fully consistent with the law, including 
decisions of the Supreme Court.”55 The initial draft guidance received 
about 230,000 public comments, and a final draft incorporating the 
comments has been submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for federal interagency review.56 The politics of an 
issue are often worked out at OMB, and given that 2012 is an election 
year, the timing of the release of the final guidance is quite uncertain. 
Thus, the 2008 Rapanos guidance and the 2003 SWANCC guidance 
are still in effect pending the finalization of the 2011 guidance.57 
Note, however, that guidance lacks the force of a formal rule;58 it 
simply reflects how the Corps and EPA interpret the CWA and their 
own current regulations.59 EPA has expressed its intent to conduct a 
formal rulemaking following the urging of Congress, industry 
organizations, environmental groups, states, and the public.60 Those 
entities and individuals are calling for a formal rulemaking to sync the 
definition of “waters of the United States” with the court cases 
because the status quo is “untenable” and causing “increased 
pollution and confusion, uncertainty, and wasted resources.”61 
II 
GROUNDWATER ENTERS THE DEBATE 
In addition to the uncertainty over the scope of CWA jurisdiction 
in general, circuits are split on the question of whether EPA and the 
 
53 Clean Water Act Definition, supra note 46. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 ELI Dialogue, supra note 45, at 10775 (statement of Donna Downing, Jurisdictional 
Team Leader, Office of Wetlands, Oceans & Watersheds, EPA). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Clean Water Act Definition, supra note 46. 
61 ELI Dialogue at 10777, 10781, 10783 (statements of Jan Goldmand-Carter, Wetlands 
and Water Resources Counsel at National Wildlife Federation, calling for a “deliberative 
science-driven rulemaking process,” and of Lawrence Liebsman, Partner at Holland & 
Knight LLP). 
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Corps may assert CWA jurisdiction over groundwater connected to 
navigable waters.62 As discussed in detail in Part III, although 
SWANCC and Rapanos factually involve wetlands, the Court’s 
decisions in these cases, and the subsequent guidance and regulation, 
affects CWA jurisdiction in general, including CWA regulation over 
discharges of pollutants into groundwater. Both the debate over 
groundwater regulation and the larger CWA jurisdictional debate 
raise both legal questions about the scope of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power and practical questions about how litigants and courts 
should determine whether the CWA applies to particular cases. 
A. Legal Groundwater 
The concept of “legal” groundwater informs the tests that courts 
use to decide whether the CWA regulates certain waters. Courts 
conceptualize groundwater differently and thus come to various 
conclusions about its regulation. Three main categories of legal 
groundwater exist;63 these categories are usually defined by state 
statutes.64 The first category is water which flows in “underground” 
streams;65 the second is “percolating” groundwater, or water that 
doesn’t flow but “ooze[s]” through small openings like water through 
coffee grounds;66 the third category is the “subflow” from surface 
streams, which includes the water in the bed underneath or around a 
stream.67 Defining groundwater using this third category is a good 
way to argue that surface and groundwater are hydrologically 
connected in order to satisfy the test for wetlands jurisdiction for 
section 404 dredge-and-fill permits.68 Similar to subflow, but 
sometimes considered a separate category, “tributary groundwater” is 
groundwater that feeds surface streams.69 Tributary groundwater is an 
 
62 See Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. 
Supp 1312, 1317 (D. Or. 1997). 
63 SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 411–13. Some states have very complex classification 
systems for groundwater. Colorado, for example, adopted a fourth category called “not 
nontributary groundwater” and has substantial case law on the fine distinctions. Id. at 413 
n.31. 
64 Id. at 411. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 412; ELI Dialogue, supra note 45, at 10785 (statement by Donna Downing, 
stating that the new CWA guidance mentions that “groundwater, particularly shallow 
subsurface flows, may be relevant as a connection among different waters”). 
69 SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 412. 
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important distinction for the hydrological connection test sometimes 
used in determining the applicability of section 402 NPDES 
permits.70 
Courts, agencies, and parties do not debate that the jurisdictional 
definition, “waters of the United States,” does not include isolated, 
non-tributary groundwater and that discharges of pollutants into 
groundwater that do not affect surface water are not subject to CWA 
regulation.71 However, courts are divided on the issue of “whether the 
discharge of pollutants into groundwater which find their way into 
and affect the waters of the United States are subject to CWA 
regulation.”72 This issue generally arises in two situations—either a 
discharge of pollutants onto dry land seeps into the ground and travels 
through groundwater to navigable water,73 or the pollutant is 
discharged into non-navigable surface water that is connected to 
navigable waters by groundwater.74 In either situation, plaintiffs 
allege that the pollution flows through the groundwater and ultimately 
contaminates navigable waters of the United States; therefore, the 
discharge should be regulated under the CWA. Some courts have held 
that the CWA does not regulate discharges of pollution to or through 
groundwater, even if it eventually affects navigable waters.75 Other 
courts have held that the CWA may be extended to regulate the 
discharge of pollutants to or through groundwater if a direct 
hydrological connection exists between the polluted groundwater and 
a navigable body of water.76 
Likely because of political constraints on the executive branch and 
the lack of clarity in the statute itself, EPA and the Corps have not 
provided guidance or regulation to help inform the courts. Both have 
marginally addressed the regulation of groundwater pollution in the 
section 402 NPDES permit context. In the section 404 dredge-and-fill 
permit context, groundwater is alluded to with the term “shallow sub-
surface hydrologic connection.”77 EPA’s “official” position is that the 
 
70 See infra Part II.B.4 (addressing the tributary groundwater theory in detail). 
71 Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1179 (D. Idaho 2001). 
72 Id. 
73 This situation would likely implicate section 402 discharge permits and most often 
arises in mining cases or animal feeding operations. 
74 This situation would likely implicate section 404 dredge-and-fill permits as it would 
probably arise where wetlands are present. 
75 Idaho Rural Council, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. 
76 Id. 
77 EPA & ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 44, at 16. 
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direct hydrologic connection test applies to section 402 NPDES 
permit situations.78 This position is “official” only in the sense that it 
appears in a proposed rule from 2001, and through this statement EPA 
reserves the right to regulate some pollution to groundwater on a 
case-by-case basis.79 Thus, neither the courts nor the EPA are clear on 
the application of the CWA to groundwater leaving parties in 
groundwater cases are left to argue both sides of the issue. 
B. The Direct Hydrological Connection Test 
Current jurisprudence is divided over whether to allow 
groundwater to confer CWA jurisdiction if there is a “direct 
hydrological connection” between the contaminated groundwater and 
regulated surface water.80 Some courts applying this test require 
plaintiffs to trace pollutants “from their source to surface waters, in 
order to come within the purview of the CWA.”81“It is not sufficient 
to allege groundwater pollution, and then to assert a general 
hydrological connection between all waters.”82 
Other courts hold that the CWA does not protect even 
hydrologically connected groundwater, even though it may produce 
an undesirable outcome. The District of Oregon case Umatilla 
Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc. 
(“Umatilla”) is a current, local opinion summarizing the arguments 
against regulating discharges to hydrologically connected 
groundwater under the CWA.83 Similar to many other jurisdictions, 
the court held: “Although the CWA’s NPDES program should apply 
 
78 NPDES Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960 (EPA Jan. 12, 2001) 
(hereinafter “NPDES/CAFO Guidelines”). 
79 James W. Hayman, Regulating Point-Source Discharges to Groundwater 
Hydrologically Connected to Navigable Waters: An Unresolved Question of 
Environmental Protection Agency Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 5 BARRY L. REV. 
95, 113–14 (2005) (“[I]n publishing and codifying the final rule, EPA omitted all 
references to requiring NPDES permits for discharges to groundwater; the term 
‘groundwater’ simply does not appear in the rule as promulgated. . . . Regarding the 
apparent ‘backing down’ from its asserted groundwater authority under the CWA in 
response to public pressure, EPA still claims groundwater authority and intends on 
exercising it, but only on a case-by-case basis.”) (footnotes omitted). 
80 Id. at 109–11. 
81 Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 
1994). 
82 Id. 
83 Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 
1312, 1318–20 (D. Or. 1997). 
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to groundwater to adequately protect surface water . . . the law as 
written, as intended by Congress, and as applied in Oregon for over 
two decades does not regulate even hydrologically-connected 
groundwater.”84 The Umatilla court, and other like-minded courts, 
reason that statutory language, legislative history, and agency 
interpretation lead to the conclusion that the direct hydrological 
connection test should not be applied.85 Courts applying the direct 
hydrological connection test find authority based on the CWA’s 
purpose and policy arguments.86 
1. Statutory Language 
Umatilla espouses the view that “when Congress wanted certain 
provisions of the CWA to apply to groundwater, it stated so 
explicitly.”87 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) requires the EPA Administrator to 
“prepare or develop comprehensive programs for preventing, 
reducing or eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters and 
ground waters and improving the sanitary condition of surface and 
underground waters.”88 Also, the Administrator must “establish, 
equip, and maintain a water quality surveillance system for the 
purpose of monitoring the quality of the navigable waters and ground 
waters and the contiguous zone and the oceans.”89 Thus, as 
evidenced from the CWA’s statutory language, Congress considered 
groundwater to be one separate category of four categories of water 
referenced in the CWA—navigable waters, the contiguous zone, the 
ocean, and groundwater.90 
Groundwater appears to be excluded specifically from section 402 
NPDES permit regulation as well. The statute on the section 402 
 
84 Id. 
85 See Hayman, supra note 79, at 106–09. 
86 See id. at 104–06. 
87 962 F. Supp. at 1318. 
88 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1994)). 
89 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(5) (1994)). 
90 Id. The Seventh Circuit similarly found that CWA does not purport to regulate all 
water, stating: “‘Waters of the United States’ must be a subset of ‘water’; otherwise why 
insert the qualifying clause in the statute?” Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson 
Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994). That court held that a six-acre artificial retention 
pond built along with the construction of a warehouse was not regulated under the CWA 
as part of “waters of the United States,” even if the pond drained into groundwater. Id. at 
965–66. “Neither the Clean Water Act nor the EPA’s definition [of waters of the United 
States] asserts authority over ground waters, just because these may be hydrologically 
connected with surface waters.” Id. at 965. 
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NPDES permit program makes no reference to groundwater and 
clearly applies to navigable waters, which Congress identified as a 
separate category of water.91 Also, Congress excluded groundwater 
from the definition of “discharge of pollutant.”92 Discharge of 
pollutant is defined as: “(A) any addition of any pollutant to 
navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any 
pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any 
point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.”93 Returning to 
the larger CWA’s categories of water, it seems that section 402 only 
applies to pollutants from three of the four categories of water. 
Some courts oppose the view that the statutory language clearly 
prevents any and all regulation of groundwater contamination.94 That 
opposing view agrees that the CWA does not attempt to regulate 
groundwater comprehensively, but argues that Congress did not 
intend its language to exempt groundwater from all regulation.95 
Congress in fact intended the CWA to apply to situations where 
pollutants passing through groundwater adversely affect surface water 
regulated by the CWA.96 The courts’ logic displays a common-sense 
approach to the interpretation of the legislative history: “In short, the 
interpretive history of the CWA only supports the unremarkable 
proposition with which all courts agree—that the CWA does not 
regulate ‘isolated/nontributary groundwater’ which has no affect [sic] 
on surface water.”97 
The statutory language is at best ambiguous when discussing 
groundwater, but many courts find the CWA purpose statement 
meaningful. In Washington Wilderness Coalition, the court chose to 
apply the hydrologic connection test because “the goal of the CWA is 
to protect the quality of surface waters, any pollutant which enters 
such waters, whether directly or through groundwater, is subject to 
regulation by NPDES permit.”98 The court reasoned that “[a]pplying 
effluent limitations to tributary groundwater does not change [the] 
nature of CWA monitoring,” and that plaintiffs still had to 
 
91 See Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1319 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994)). 
92 Id. 
93 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006) (emphasis added). 
94 See Hayman, supra note 79, at 110. 
95 Wash. Wilderness Coal. v Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 989–90 (E.D. Wash. 
1994); Sierra Club v. Colo. Ref. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1433–34 (D. Colo. 1993). 
96 Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1180 (D. Idaho 2001). 
97 Id. (quoting Wash. Wilderness Coal., 870 F. Supp. at 990). 
98 870 F. Supp. at 990. 
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demonstrate a direct hydrological connection rather than just a 
general assertion of connectivity to all waters.99 Similarly, in Sierra 
Club v. Colorado Refining Company, the court found that the Tenth 
Circuit favored a broad interpretation of the waters protected by the 
CWA because Congress’s declared goal and policy was “to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”100 The court discussed disparities in CWA 
groundwater case law in general101 and relied on Tenth Circuit case 
law in particular,102 holding that “the Clean Water Act’s preclusion of 
the discharge of any pollutant into ‘navigable waters’ includes such 
discharge which reaches ‘navigable waters’ through groundwater.”103 
Many courts, including those in Washington Wilderness Coalition and 
Sierra Club,104 are in accord with the seemingly simple and big-
 
99 Id. 
100 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433–34 (D. Colo. 1993) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) 
(1994)). In Sierra Club, the plaintiff’s claim stated a valid cause of action when it alleged 
the defendant had and continued to discharge pollutants from its refinery into the soils and 
groundwater beneath its property, which then made their way to navigable water through 
the groundwater. Id. 
101 The Sierra Club court compares two decisions that reached opposite conclusions 
about the Fifth Circuit case, Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977). Id. at 
1433. The court in Kelley v. United States, No. 79–10199 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (“Kelley I”), 
concluded that Exxon held that “wastes which migrate from groundwaters back into 
surface waters are within EPA’s regulatory jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Kelley ex rel. People 
of State of Mich. v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1106 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (“Kelley 
II”) (citing Kelley I, No 79-10199, slip op. at 2–3)). Conversely, Kelley II, relying 
“considerably on the opinion in Exxon,” held that “the Clean Water Act did not extend 
federal authority to the regulation of groundwater contamination.” Id. (discussing Kelley 
II, 618 F. Supp. at 1107). See also Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 
F.2d 1438, 1451 (1st Cir. 1992) (agreeing with the Corps that since determinations about 
permitting “ultimately involve[ ] an ecological judgment about the relationship between 
surface waters and groundwaters, it should be left in the first instance to the discretion of 
the EPA and the Corps”); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. 
Supp. 1182, 1193–94 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (“Congress did not intend to require NPDES 
permits for discharges of pollutants to isolated groundwater. On the other hand, permits 
might be required for discharges to groundwater that has a direct hydrological connection 
to surface waters that themselves constitute ‘waters of the United States.’”); New York v. 
United States, 620 F. Supp. 374, 375–76, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (declining to reach the 
issue of groundwater since the plaintiffs also alleged a surface water connection in a 
situation where contaminated groundwater was presumably tributary to navigable surface 
water). 
102 Cases discussed include Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 
1985), and United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979). 
103 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1434. 
104 See Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1179 (D. Idaho 2001) 
(citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852 (7th Cir. 1977); Friends of Santa Fe 
MAKOWSKI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  1:09 PM 
512 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 495 
picture view elucidated by Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma that 
“whether pollution is introduced by a visible, above-ground conduit 
or enters the surface water through the aquifer matters little to the 
fish, waterfowl, and recreational users which are affected by the 
degradation of our nation’s rivers and streams.”105 
2. Legislative History 
The legislative history suggests Congress did not intend to regulate 
groundwater for two main reasons.106 First, the Senate Public Works 
Committee Report, which accompanied the Senate version of the 
CWA, considered adding groundwater to the NPDES permit program. 
In this Report the Committee stated: 
Several bills pending before the Committee provided authority to 
establish Federally approved standards for groundwaters which 
permeate rock, soil and other surface formations. Because the 
jurisdiction regarding groundwaters is so complex and varied from 
State to State, the Committee did not adopt this recommendation.107 
Umatilla and other courts took this quote very literally to mean that 
“Congress did not intend to regulate groundwater in any form.”108 
Essentially, this passage means that the Senate Committee chose not 
to extend CWA regulation to all groundwater, but it does not 
necessarily mean that all groundwater is excluded from regulation.109 
A sophisticated analysis of this passage must also consider that the 
Committee “recognize[d] the essential link between ground and 
surface waters and the artificial nature of any distinction” and thus 
required each state to include in its section 402 NPDES permit 
program “affirmative controls over the injection or placement in wells 
 
Cnty. v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1357 (D.N.M. 1995); Wash. Wilderness 
Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 1994); Sierra Club, 838 F. 
Supp. at 1434; McClellan, 707 F. Supp. at 1196). 
105 Idaho Rural Council, 143 F. Supp. at 1179–80. The Idaho Rural Council court 
denied the dairy farmer’s motion for summary judgment on pollution of a spring but 
cautioned the plaintiffs that they had the burden of proof to show that Grand View Dairy 
polluted groundwater that was hydrologically connected to the springs and that the 
discharges must be traced from their source to those springs. Id. at 1180–81. 
106 See Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. 
Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Or. 1997). 
107 Id. at 1318 (quoting McClellan, 707 F. Supp. at 1194 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, 
at 73 (1971))). 
108 Id. at 1318–19 (citing McClellan, 707 F. Supp. at 1194). 
109 See Thomas L. Casey, Reevaluating “Isolated Waters”: Is Hydrologically 
Connected Groundwater “Navigable Water” Under the Clean Water Act, 54 ALA. L. REV. 
159, 169 (2002). 
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or any pollutants that may affect ground water.”110 Further, courts 
should, but often do not, question what standards the Committee is 
referring to—whether they are either effluent limits for discharges of 
waste or ambient limits for the quality of the receiving body of 
water.111 If the Committee’s statement expressed reluctance to 
regulate ambient standards, then its Report would not support the 
proposition that groundwater is not subject to regulation under section 
402 NPDES permits.112 Although there are arguments to the contrary, 
the Senate Committee Report seems clear to some courts, including 
Umatilla, to be an “unequivocal recital” that Congress did not intend 
to regulate “subsurface discharges” under the CWA.113 
The second important piece of CWA legislative history is the 
debate surrounding the proposed Aspin Amendment. The House 
specifically rejected an amendment proposed by Representative 
Leslie “Les” Aspin that would have brought groundwater within the 
CWA’s enforcement and permit sections.114 Representative Aspin 
was concerned with the effects of deep well injection and the “glaring 
inconsistency” of the fact that groundwater appears in every section 
of the CWA except the enforcement section.115 He correctly noted: 
“If we do not stop pollution of ground waters through seepage and 
other means, ground water gets into navigable waters, and to control 
only the navigable water and not the ground water makes no sense at 
all.”116 By not regulating groundwater, oil companies and other 
companies could pollute through “waste injection wells.”117 He also 
noted that this inconsistency strongly favored the oil industry because 
certain by-products of the oil production process were excluded from 
the definition of “pollutant” under section 304 of the CWA.118 
 
110 Id. at 170 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 73). 
111 Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges into Groundwater: The Crucial Link 
in Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 569, 626 
(1988). 
112 See id. at 615–16. 
113 Id. at 615 (quoting United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (S.D. Tex. 
1975), and citing Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d. 1310, 1325 (5th Cir. 1977)); Umatilla, 
962 F. Supp. at 1318–19. 
114 Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, 962 F. Supp. 1312, 
1318–19 (D. Or. 1997). 
115 Casey, supra note 109, at 171 (quoting 92 CONG. REC. 10,666 (1972)). 
116 Id. (quoting 92 CONG. REC. 10,666 (1972)). 
117 Id. (citing 92 CONG. REC. 10,666 (1972)). 
118 Id. at 171, 171 n.106 (citing section 502 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
33 U.S.C. § 1362 (1972)). 
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Representative Robert Kastenmeier, supporting Representative 
Aspin’s amendment, criticized the oil industry for having “the sheer 
nerve to seek an exemption from antipollution laws” after it had 
reaped more benefits than any other industry from special-interest 
litigation.119 
Opponents to the amendment either expressed views that 
groundwater should be regulated by the states or that it was already 
sufficiently federally regulated. Representative Donald Clausen, an 
opponent of the amendment, stated that in the early deliberations the 
Senate Committee thoroughly considered a provision for groundwater 
and decided “that there was not sufficient information on ground 
waters to justify the types of controls that are required for navigable 
waters.”120 Representative H. Ray Roberts also opposed the 
amendment, stating the oil industry was already so heavily regulated 
that it was not necessary to try to regulate it using the CWA.121 
The Umatilla court and others see the rejection of the amendment 
as an indication that Congress did not intend to regulate groundwater 
under the CWA.122 A more accurate assessment of legislative history 
of the CWA is that the exclusion of groundwater is inconclusive and 
can be used to support either side of the argument.123 A weakness in 
Umatilla is the cursory mention of legislative history without 
recognizing the influence of the oil and gas industry and the effect the 
Aspin Amendment would have had on deleting the oil and gas 
exception.124 Regardless, the legislative history is not dispositive on 
congressional intent regarding groundwater under the CWA. What the 
legislative history conclusively shows, though, is that groundwater is 
more complex and nuanced to regulate than surface water and 
requires greater protection than the CWA permit program currently 
provides. 
 
119 Id. at 172 (citing 92 CONG. REC. 10,669 (1972)); see also 40 C.F.R. § 
122.26(a)(2)(ii) (2008); Regulation of Oil and Gas Construction Activities, EPA (Mar. 9, 
2009), http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/oilgas.cfm. 
120 Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1319 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 10,667 (1972)). 
121 Casey, supra note 109, at 172 (citing 92 CONG. REC. 10,668 (1972)). 
122 Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1318; Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d. 1310, 1325 (5th 
Cir. 1977); United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383–84 (S.D. Tex. 1975). 
123 See Wood, supra note 111, at 615, 617. 
124 When analyzing the legislative history, courts must understand that the Aspin 
Amendment would have deleted the exemption for gas and oil waste injection wells. Id. at 
613. Thus, the exclusion of the amendment could likely evidence the political power of the 
oil and gas industry more than a Congressional intent to exclude hydrologically connected 
groundwater. 
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3. Agency Interpretation 
EPA and individual state agencies also seem to interpret the CWA 
as excluding groundwater from regulation. Specifically in Umatilla, 
the court noted that “EPA has offered no formal or consistent 
interpretation of the CWA that would subject discharges to 
groundwater to the NPDES permitting requirement” and “an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute that it administers is entitled to great 
deference.”125 Umatilla cited two 1970s EPA regulations adopting 
advice contained in a 1973 letter from the Office of General Counsel 
to EPA stating, “[d]ischarges into groundwater are not included” in 
the NPDES permit program.126 Oregon’s Department of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ) is the agency that administered the 
CWA in Oregon, and according to the Umatilla decision, the state 
agency “ha[d] clearly interpreted that Act’s NPDES program as not 
applying to discharges to groundwater.”127 The DEQ and Oregon 
statutes distinguished groundwater and surface water and had separate 
programs for permitting discharges to both.128 EPA approved 
Oregon’s NPDES program, knew about Oregon’s system of 
regulating groundwater separately from NPDES permits, and never 
objected or required Oregon to change its NPDES program during the 
twenty-five years of water quality regulation in the state.129 Oregon’s 
permit system was not controlling, but the fact that EPA approved of 
the system and had not sought to change it lent “weight to [the] 
conclusion that the CWA’s NPDES program does not apply to any 
discharges to groundwater.”130 
Also, as a practical policy matter, the Umatilla court was 
concerned with the reliance permitees have placed on the state and 
federal permit systems. The court expressed concern that suddenly 
bringing discharges to hydrologically-connected groundwater under 
CWA permits would “add a new level of uncertainty and expense to 
NPDES permitting.”131 It also cautioned that an expansion of the 
 
125 Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1319 (citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1995), and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 1320. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
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permit system “would expose potentially hundreds of permitees” to 
liability or litigation “if they or the DEQ has happened to make the 
‘wrong’ choice about which kind of permit discharges to groundwater 
require.”132 
On the other hand, the Washington Wilderness Coalition court 
found authority for the hydrological connection test in EPA’s 
preamble to NPDES Permit Regulation for Storm Water 
Discharges.133 The preamble stipulated that permit regulation does 
not apply to groundwater “unless there is a hydrological connection 
between the groundwater and a nearby surface water body.”134 The 
court took this preamble to explain, “EPA’s policy to require NPDES 
permits for discharges which may enter surface water via 
groundwater, as well as those that enter directly.”135 The court’s 
interpretation of the preamble is corroborated by EPA’s proposed 
regulation of concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFO’s), 
which stated that the direct hydrologic connection test applies to 
section 402 NPDES permit situations.136 
4. Policy Considerations 
From a policy standpoint, it makes sense to allow regulation of 
pollution to hydrologically connected groundwater because Congress 
did not intend to create “a ground water loophole through which the 
discharges of pollutants could flow, unregulated, to surface water.”137 
Congress wrote the CWA with the hydrologic cycle in mind; the 
Senate Report notes that “[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is 
essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source.”138 
Even courts like Umatilla, which choose not to apply the direct 
hydrologic connection test, acknowledge the practical reality that 
pollution to hydrologically connected groundwater impacts surface 
water and should be controlled at the source.139 
 
132 Id. 
133 Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 
1994). 
134 Id. (citing NPDES Permit Regulations for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 
47990, 47997 (Nov. 16, 1990)). 
135 Id. at 991. 
136 See NPDES/CAFO Guidelines, supra note 78. 
137 Id. at 3016. 
138 Id.; Wood, supra note 111, at 592. 
139 Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 
1312, 1318 (D. Or. 1997). 
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An offshoot of the hydrological connection approach is the 
tributary groundwater140 theory, which was proposed by scholar and 
professor Mary Wood.141 In some section 402 cases, the theory may 
assist in convincing a court of a hydrological connection.142 The 
tributary groundwater theory recommends that EPA “assert that the 
term ‘navigable waters’ extends to all groundwater which feeds into 
surface water, since such groundwater is tributary in the true sense of 
the word and thus falls within the definition of ‘waters of the United 
States.’”143 From a policy standpoint, “[g]iven the intimate 
hydrological connection between most ground and surface water, 
pollution control of surface water may be greatly frustrated with 
concomitant protection of tributary groundwater.”144 Federal courts 
have interpreted the CWA definition of navigable waters—“waters of 
the United States”—broadly to include waters tributary to those 
which are navigable in fact.145 The tributary groundwater theory 
expands the definition of navigable waters based on the understanding 
that groundwater is hydrologically connected to surface water. 
A recent case uses the tributary groundwater theory to support its 
use of the direct hydrological test. In Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil 
Company, citizens and property owners sued a petroleum company 
and owner of a former service station because of release of hazardous 
substances due to underground storage tank leaks.146 The plaintiffs 
argued that the First Circuit’s position was not to categorically 
exclude groundwater from “waters of the United States” but rather to 
determine its status based on an “ecological judgment” according to 
the specific facts of each individual site.147 The court noted that 
although Congress did not intend for isolated groundwater to be 
regulated under the CWA permit requirements, case law did not 
preclude the Act from applying to “tributary groundwater,” or water 
that migrates from the ground to surface water, which was the case in 
 
140 “Tributary groundwater” is groundwater that feeds surface streams by migrating 
from the ground to the surface. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 412. 
141 Wood, supra note 111, at 626. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 570. 
145 Sierra Club v. Colo. Ref. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (D. Colo. 1993) (citing 
Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985)). 
146 Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 175, 176 (D.P.R. 2009). 
147 Id. at 179. 
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that situation.148 The court held that CWA jurisdiction extended to 
groundwater that was hydrologically connected to surface waters that 
qualified as “waters of the United States.”149 The court reasoned, “the 
decision not to comprehensively regulate groundwater as part of the 
CWA does not require the conclusion that Congress intended to 
exempt groundwater from all regulation . . . .”150 The court 
recognized the split among circuits on regulation of groundwater 
under the CWA, but found that First Circuit precedent did not 
preclude its ruling.151 
5. Practical Concerns 
Potential litigants bringing causes of action under the CWA for 
groundwater pollution must recognize that the circuits are split on 
whether to apply the direct hydrological connection test. Even in 
jurisdictions that apply or do not preclude the possibility of applying 
the hydrological connection test, litigants may have trouble meeting 
the high burden of proof required to show the connection. Given the 
difficulty of this test both legally and scientifically, one practical 
solution may be to find a way to allege some type of surface 
connection in addition to the groundwater connection. 
Proving a direct hydrological connection is difficult for many 
reasons, one of which is that EPA and the Corps have not defined 
“direct.”152 Regulators, regulated entities, and courts could use 
several different factors to determine how “direct” the connection 
between surface water and groundwater or pollutants is: (1) distance 
the pollutant or groundwater actually travels, (2) distance between the 
point of discharge and the surface water, (3) time of travel for the 
pollutant, or (4) the concentration and severity of the pollutants that 
remain when the groundwater reaches the surface.153 
Even if the legal standard were defined, practical scientific issues 
complicate the legal test of a hydrological connection.154 In brief, 
determining a direct hydrological connection requires a hydrologic 
study of “the nature of the aquifer, the distance and flow path the 
groundwater must travel, the time required for travel, and fate of the 
 
148 Id. at 179–80. 
149 Id. at 181. 
150 Id. 
151 See id. at 179–81. 
152 Hayman, supra note 79, at 117–18. 
153 Id. 
154 See id. at 118–19. 
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pollutants during travel,” because no factor alone provides a true 
measure of hydrological connectivity.155 Complicating factors include 
the fact that water may not follow the most direct route when flowing 
downhill and discharging into lakes and rivers.156 Additionally, 
pollutants transported through groundwater may be dissolved, carried 
along in the groundwater, chemically or biologically changed, or 
filtered by the materials through which they pass.157 Thus, even when 
judges choose to apply the direct hydrological test, they candidly 
warn the parties of the difficulty of proving that connection.158 
One practical approach to ease the difficult burden of the 
hydrological connection test, as suggested by several cases, is to 
allege a surface connection independent of the groundwater 
connection. In Quivira Mining Corp. v. EPA, the Tenth Circuit held 
that EPA had the authority to issue CWA section 402 NPDES permits 
regulating uranium mining company discharges into normally dry 
gullies (“arroyos”) in New Mexico.159 There, the arroyos were not 
navigable-in-fact, but at times of heavy rainfall had a surface 
connection with navigable waters.160 Additionally, the waters of the 
arroyos soaked into the underground aquifers, which eventually 
discharged into navigable waters.161 The plaintiffs did not allege a 
direct hydrological connection, but the court found that together the 
seasonal surface connection and the groundwater connection allowed 
the EPA to issue a section 402 NPDES permit.162 
A recent Fifth Circuit case similarly demonstrates the potential 
usefulness of alleging a surface connection to supplement allegations 
of a groundwater connection. In Rice v. Harken Exploration 
Company, an oil and gas company discharged pollutants onto dry 
ground and into a seasonal creek which flowed into a navigable river 
in times of heavy rainfall.163 The court held that the plaintiffs did not 
sufficiently prove a discharge of pollution was linked to a navigable 
 
155 Id. at 124. 
156 Id. at 122. 
157 Id. at 123–24. 
158 See Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1180–81 (D. Idaho 2001) 
(explaining the heavy burden of proof for plaintiffs; in this case plaintiffs only survived 
motion to dismiss and did not yet prove connection). 
159 Quivira Mining Corp. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985). 
160 Id. at 129. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 130. 
163 See Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F. 3d 264, 265 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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waterway when there was no evidence of at least a seasonal surface 
water connection or direct evidence of pollution to the surface 
water.164 The plaintiffs offered significant evidence that the 
groundwater underneath the property had been contaminated by the 
discharges onto the surface land but did not connect that 
contamination with a navigable water.165 The court criticized the 
plaintiffs for not including a “detailed or comprehensive description 
of any of these seasonal creeks . . . about how often the creek runs, 
about how much water flows through it when it runs, or about 
whether the creek ever flows directly (above ground) into the 
Canadian River.”166 Basically, nothing on the record would convince 
a reasonable trier of fact that the discharge was sufficiently linked to 
an open body of navigable water.167 Further, a generalized assertion 
that navigable waters would be affected by the contaminated 
groundwater was insufficient—a more direct hydrological connection 
was needed.168 The court suggested that the plaintiffs’ expert 
geologist could have indicated the level of actual oil contamination in 
the navigable river, discussed flow rates of the river, estimated when 
or to what extent the groundwater contaminants would affect the 
river—anything to “produce evidence of a close, direct and proximate 
link between [the] discharges of oil and any resulting actual, 
identifiable oil contamination of a particular body of natural surface 
water.”169 
Rice is an important case for several reasons. First, it gives some 
concrete examples of how plaintiffs may satisfy the direct 
hydrological connection test and provides ideas of how to supplement 
the groundwater data with allegations of occasional surface water 
connections. Second, the data the court asks for evidences the 
difficulty and cost of meeting the direct hydrological connection test. 
Third, discharge of oil and significant contamination of groundwater 
 
164 Id. at 271. This case actually involved a claim under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 
but because both statutes apply to “navigable waters,” defined as “waters of the United 
States,” and because there was far more case law interpreting the CWA, the court used 
CWA case law in its analysis. Id. at 267–68. Its holding applies to “waters of the United 
States” in both the CWA and the OPA. Id. 
165 Id. at 272. 
166 Id. at 270–71. The plaintiffs’ experts merely described the streams as intermittent 
and only generally asserted that navigable water was down gradient from the land where 
the discharge occurred. Id. 
167 See id. at 272. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
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in Rice seems to be similar to what is happening in areas of natural 
gas mining and production, an area where future CWA cases 
involving groundwater will likely arise. 
III 
THE GROUNDWATER DEBATE AND THE LARGER QUESTIONS OF CWA 
JURISDICTION 
The circuit split and general confusion over the applicability of the 
direct hydrological connection test for pollution in groundwater is a 
subset of the chaos over the question of CWA jurisdiction following 
SWANCC and Rapanos. This final section will discuss how the larger 
CWA jurisdictional debate affects the narrower issue of CWA 
regulation of groundwater from a legal, practical, and political 
standpoint. 
From a legal standpoint, SWANCC and Rapanos raise the question, 
but do not decide the constitutional limit, of Congress’s power under 
the Commerce Clause. Entire law review articles have been written 
on this issue,170 but it is sufficient to note for this Comment that any 
decision on the constitutionality of the CWA spurred by the wetlands 
controversy influences the groundwater debate as well. The regulation 
of wetlands is “stretch[ing] the other limits of Congress’s commerce 
power and rais[ing] difficult questions about the scope of that 
power,”171 so the regulation of groundwater could be seen as even 
more of a stretch of that power. 
To the contrary, some courts, like the Tenth Circuit, hold the view 
that “Congress intended to regulate discharges into every creek, 
stream, river or body of water that in any way may affect interstate 
commerce,”172 and that a groundwater connection through 
underground aquifers may be a sufficient impact on interstate 
commerce.173 The Tenth Circuit is in the minority, though. It is more 
 
170 William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution: SWANCC 
and Beyond, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10741 (2001), available at Westlaw 2 L. 
of Envtl. Prot. § 13:117. 
171 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006). 
172 Sierra Club v. Colo. Ref. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (D. Colo. 1993) (quoting 
United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979)). 
173 Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Further, the 
record supports the finding that both the Arroyo del Puerto and San Mateo Creek flow for 
a period after the time of discharge of pollutants into the waters. Further, the flow 
continues regularly through underground aquifers fed by the surface flow of the San Mateo 
Creek and Arroyo del Puerto into navigable-in-fact streams. The court finds that the 
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likely that the United States Supreme Court would find that the 
regulation of discharges to or through groundwater would 
impermissibly go beyond the bounds of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause. 
From a practical standpoint, the broad CWA jurisdictional debate 
ties to the specific groundwater debate because some wetlands cases 
may allege groundwater pollution; the direct hydrological connection 
test may help satisfy the significant nexus or adjacency tests used to 
assert CWA jurisdiction. Further, the 2011 proposed guidance on 
CWA jurisdiction allows a “shallow sub-surface hydrologic 
connection” between wetlands and jurisdictional waters to satisfy the 
adjacency test.174 At a recent dialogue about jurisdiction under the 
new CWA guidance, Corps and EPA representatives mentioned that 
“groundwater, particularly shallow subsurface flows, may be relevant 
as a connection among different waters.”175 
Two recent cases, Northern California River Watch v. City of 
Healdsburg176 and United States v. Banks,177 illustrate the 
significance of the inclusion of shallow, subsurface water in section 
404 cases and further the proposition that future section 402 plaintiffs 
should allege a surface connection as well as a groundwater 
connection. In Northern California River Watch, plaintiffs alleged a 
hydrologic groundwater connection, occasional surface water 
connections, and an ecological connection to bring a cause of action 
for illegal discharge of pollutants under a section 402 NPDES 
permit.178 The Ninth Circuit held that both Rapanos’s tests, adjacency 
 
impact on interstate commerce is sufficient enough to satisfy the commerce clause. And, 
as noted above, it was the clear intent of Congress to regulate waters of the United States 
to the fullest extent possible under the commerce clause.”). 
174 EPA & ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 44, at 16–17 
(defining “shallow subsurface hydrologic connection [as] lateral water flow through a 
shallow subsurface layer, such as may be found in steeply sloping forested areas with 
shallow soils, soils with a restrictive horizon, or in karst systems”). 
175 ELI Dialogue, supra note 45, at 10785 (statement by Donna Downing, Jurisdiction 
Team Leader, Office of Wetland, Oceans & Watersheds, EPA). 
176 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007). 
177 United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 1997). 
178 496 F.3d at 1000–01. In this case, the city was dumping pollutants from its waste 
treatment plant into a rock quarry pit, separated by a man-made levee but draining via 
aquifer into a nearby river, which was indisputably navigable. Id. at 996. The water and 
the pollution passed through the bottom and sides of the pond and percolated through 
gravel into the river, but in times of high water, the pond water flowed over the surface 
into the river. Id. River Watch filed suit alleging that the City was violating the Clean 
Water Act by discharging without a NPDES permit. Id. at 995. 
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and significant nexus, were satisfied.179 The pond receiving the 
polluted discharges was part of a larger wetland that was adjacent to a 
navigable river, and a substantial nexus existed between the pond and 
river.180 The significant nexus test was met partially by the evidence 
of a direct hydrological connection.181 Although the surface 
connection only occurred when the river overflowed, the underground 
hydrological connection was continuous because the pond water 
flowed to the river through the underground aquifer.182 The water and 
the pollution passed through the bottom and sides of the pond, 
percolating through gravel into the river,183 which is seemingly a 
shallow, sub-surface flow.184 Additionally, the waters were connected 
ecologically and chemically; the same bird, fish, and mammal 
population lived in or around the pond and river, and the hazardous 
chemical levels in the river upstream of the pond were clearly lower 
than those downstream.185 The court’s reasoning thus demonstrates 
that the direct hydrological connection test for groundwater may be an 
important tool for plaintiffs alleging a significant nexus in cases 
involving wetlands. 
In Banks, the court used evidence of hydrologically connected 
groundwater to meet the adjacency test for wetlands in a section 404 
dredge-and-fill permit case.186 There, the defendant’s land was 
separated from adjacent wetlands by a road and about a half mile.187 
Experts testified that a hydrological connection did exist between the 
land and the wetlands; the “connection was primarily through 
groundwater, but also occurred through surface water during 
storms.”188 There was also ecological adjacency because the 
defendant’s land served as wildlife habitat.189 Together, Banks and 
Northern California River Watch demonstrate that even if the direct 
hydrological connection test is not sufficient to prove a cause of 
action on its own in section 402 cases, it may be useful corroboration 
 
179 Id. at 1000. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 996. 
184 See EPA & ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 44, at 17. 
185 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007). 
186 United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d at 916, 921 (11th Cir. 1997). 
187 Id. at 920. 
188 Id. at 921. 
189 Id. 
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in cases involving wetlands. Future plaintiffs should use these cases 
as an example of the importance of alleging a surface water 
connection in addition to a groundwater connection and should also 
pay attention to future developments in CWA jurisdictional cases. 
The role of politics in CWA administration is complex and 
prevents the speedy clarification of both the issues surrounding 
section 404 wetlands cases and section 402 groundwater cases. 
Experts in the CWA field are fairly confident that the United States 
Supreme Court will not take on another wetlands CWA case to clarify 
the SWANCC and Rapanos issues before EPA and the Corps have 
defined jurisdiction through rulemaking.190 Thus, even given the 
circuit split, it is highly improbable that the Court will take on a case 
deciding whether the CWA may regulate hydrologically connected 
groundwater. This is because of the broad implications of deciding a 
case that questions the CWA navigable water definition.191 
Currently, individual state’s regulations are the primary regulatory 
force protecting groundwater in section 402 discharge situations, and 
certain groups would like to insure that federal regulation over 
groundwater stays minimal.192 EPA and the Corps are facing 
difficulty in creating rules or guidance that would clarify the CWA 
jurisdiction over wetlands or hydrologically connected groundwater, 
in part because of alleged federalism concerns.193 Opponents of 
EPA’s guidance feel threatened by the prospect of EPA legislating by 
 
190 ELI Dialogue, supra note 45, at 10789 (statements by Lawrence R. Liebesman, 
partner at Holland & Knight LLP, and Jan Goldmand-Carter, Wetlands and Water 
Resources Counsel at National Wildlife Federation). 
191 A case that determines whether hydrologically connected groundwater falls under 
CWA jurisdiction would have broad implications for all other types of CWA cases, 
including section 404 dredge-and-fill cases, because the definition of “navigable waters” 
as “waters of the United States” applies to all sections of the CWA. 
192 On June 19, 2012, the House Appropriations Committee released the Fiscal Year 
2013 Interior-Environment Appropriations Funding Bill. Appropriations Committee 
Releases the Fiscal Year 2013 Interior-Environment Appropriations Funding Bill, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS (June 19, 2012), 
http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=299989. 
Committee Chairman Hal Rogers stated, “[t]his bill cuts spending on programs by more 
than a billion dollars, and prevents the EPA and other federal bureaucracies from stepping 
out of their lane and stifling our economic recovery.” Interior Subcommittee Chairman 
Mike Simpson stated, “[t]he bill reins in funding and out-of-control regulation at the 
EPA.” 
193 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. at 159, 172–73; House Passes Bill to Reign in EPA Regulatory 
Overreach, U.S. CONGRESSMAN HAL ROGERS (July 13, 2011), http://halrogers.house.gov 
/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=251786. 
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regulating, concretely defining broad CWA jurisdictional authority, 
and overstepping States’ decisions regarding water quality 
standards.194 The House of Representatives passed legislation dubbed 
the “Rein in EPA Act,” which would forbid the Corps and EPA from 
issuing any clarifying guidance.195 Industry lobbyists and political 
forces behind the “Rein in EPA Act” and the rider bill to cut 
regulatory funding base their arguments on federalism, arguing for 
less federal and more state regulation.196 The bill passed in the House 
and is pending a vote in the Senate.197 
There is also a rider to the Interior-EPA Appropriations Bill that 
includes a number of provisions that would stop or slow EPA 
regulatory actions and prohibit the promulgation of any rule that 
defines waters of the United States.198 EPA is no stranger to intense 
political criticism and will most likely publish the guidance relatively 
soon; a formal rulemaking process will take much longer. 
Relying on state regulation instead of CWA jurisdiction for 
groundwater pollution or pollutants transmitted through groundwater 
is not a perfect solution, but it seems to be a practical alternative in 
light of the case law, proposed guidance, and political controversy. 
Some states expansively define waters of the United States and 
adequately protect water resources, including groundwater, while 
others have weak or failing state regulatory programs.199 State 
 
194 House Passes Bill to Reign in EPA Regulatory Overreach, U.S. CONGRESSMAN 
HAL ROGERS (July 13, 2011), http://halrogers.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx 
?DocumentID=251786. 
195 See Clean Water Cooperative Federalism Act of 2011, H.R. 2018, 112th Cong. 
(2011). The bill passed in the House on July 13, 2011. H.R. 2018, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2018 (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
196 Industry lobbyists and representatives allege that the draft guidance violates 
federalism principles by taking an over-broad approach. “The Clean Water Act is a shared 
joint federalism approach,” not “the idea that federal government knows it all, that the 
federal government can regulate every wet spot in the country.” ELI Dialogue, supra note 
45, at 10780 (statements by Lawrence Liebesman). 
197 H.R. 2018, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2018 (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
198 Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 
of 2013, H.R. 6091 § 434, 112th Cong. (2012). See also EPA Water Initiative Draws Fire, 
CLEAN WATER ACTION, http://www.cleanwateraction.org/feature/epa-wate-initiative        
-draws-fire (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) (noting how lobbyists from ExxonMobil, Marathon 
Oil, and the American Petroleum Institute demanded earlier in 2011 that the EPA/Corps’ 
proposed guidance be withdrawn). 
199 States that have strong water protection laws include Maryland, Virginia, New 
Jersey, and, California. ELI Dialogue, supra note 45, at 10784 (discussion between Jan 
Goldmand-Carter, Lawrence Liebesman, and Donna Downing). States with weak or 
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regulation instead of federal regulation has its downfalls, though. 
Polluting industries could locate or litigate in states with less stringent 
regulation.200 Also, the CWA is a shared responsibility between the 
federal government and the states, as evidenced by the delegation of 
the NPDES program to qualifying states.201 However, without strong 
federal law behind them, state regulatory programs can and do 
sometimes fail.202 
CONCLUSION 
State and federal regulation of pollutants that travel through 
groundwater are crucial to protect the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the nation’s surface waters, and the Clean 
Water Act could be a valuable tool in the regulatory process. 
Currently, CWA jurisprudence is in a state of confusion over the 
broad question of CWA jurisdiction and the narrower question of 
CWA groundwater regulation. The bodies of law on both questions 
inform each other and share similar legal, practical, and political 
concerns. Potential litigants in section 404 and 402 cases will need to 
present significant scientific data to prove a direct hydrological 
connection linking groundwater and navigable water and allege an 
additional surface connection if possible. Groundwater issues arising 
under the CWA will not likely be settled anytime soon, although 
political decision and court cases will continue to impact and alter 
agency action on various interrelated CWA issues. 
 
 
threatened laws include Florida, Wisconsin, and North Carolina. Id. Those three states 
have passed laws that restrict state programs and do not allow them to become more 
stringent than the underpinning federal laws. Id. 
200 EPA Water Initiative Draws Fire, supra note 198. 
201 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006). 
202 ELI Dialogue, 10784 (discussion between Jan Goldmand-Carter, Lawrence 
Liebesman, and Donna Downing). 
